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In the European Union and elsewhere, there are diverging opinions concerning
the costs and beneﬁts of vertical integration in the rail industry. Traditionally,
national rail markets in Europe have been marked by large, vertically integrated,
national operators. Some economists and some policy-makers believe that vertical
separation would boost competition in the rail industry, and would make the rail
sector more attractive compared to inter-modal competitors like car and airplane.
Others believe that separation of infrastructure from operations reduces the eﬃ-
ciency of the rail sector and that the potential anti-competitive eﬀects of integration
can be mitigated by appropriate regulation.
This report contains two parts that look at some of the relevant arguments
concerning competition and eﬃciency eﬀects of vertical integration. The report is
meant to be a progress report, not a ﬁnal output. Our work on the topic vertical
integration continues.
The ﬁrst part presents a simple industrial organization model that compares
two situations: In the ﬁrst situation, a monopolistic infrastructure provider is in-
tegrated with a downstream operator who competes with other operators. In the
second situation, the infrastructure monopoly is separated from downstream oper-
ations. Our simple model shows that the degree to which separation can enhance
downstream competition depends on the ﬁnancial capability of a regulator (or a
procurement agency). More precisely, while separation increases the quantities of
traﬃc downstream, it is also associated with an increase in the subsidies that must
be paid for the provision of infrastructure services.
The second part presents a survey of the work of transaction cost economics
on vertical integration. The survey shows that over some period of time, the lit-
erature has put much emphasis on incentives to invest in integrated and separated
structures. It also identiﬁes some more recent work that looks on the problems of
day-to-day coordination and adjustment processes, and on related empirical work.
Besides making an eﬀort to bring together relevant literature, this part is also meant
to deﬁne a framework for the elaboration of case studies from Deutsche Bahn that




Regulation and the Costs of Public
Funds (With Implications for
Railroad Reforms)
1
1This part has been written with Aldo Gonzales. We thank Gary Biglaiser, Sergei Guriev,
Marc Ivaldi, Markus Ksoll, Russell Pittman and Patrick Rey for helpful discussions. All errors
are ours.1. Introduction
Throughout the least two decades, network industries have gone through sub-
stantial reforms. Many countries have deregulated their electricity, gas, telecom,
water and air transportation markets. There are important eﬀorts to integrate
markets across borders in order to increase consumer welfare.
Reforms in the railroad sector have until recently been slow, but there is now a
similar push towards more integrated markets, in particular in the EU. The Euro-
pean Commission, in its White Paper (EC, 2001), has declared the development of
the European railway system one of its priorities. Open access to national railway
markets (EC, Directive 91/440) is a cornerstone of the reforms, and more concrete
steps, in particular, in the freight market have been undertaken.
2
Most of the large railroad ﬁrms used to be (or - still are) monopolies on their
national market. They are now faced with the prospect of EU-wide deregulation
and, ultimately, the prospect of privatisation. Traditionally, national rail network
ﬁrms are integrated; they comprise both infrastructure and operations. One of the
crucial questions in the reform debate in the EU, but also in transition economies
such as Russia, is whether infrastructure should be separated from operations prior
to privatization or whether integration should be maintained even after privatiza-
tion.
There is a strong belief that the separation of infrastructure from operations
is a necessary condition to make the sector more competitive. The following quote
from a speech by Mario Monti (2002) is representative for this view:
“The problem with vertically integrated incumbents in an emerg-
ing competitive market is well known and is not new. Such a
company is present in all the most important stages of the sector’s
activities including, crucially, applying the conditions of access to
the network. This can lead to discrimination against third parties.
A company which is engaged not only in marketing capacity on its
network but also providing its own services over that network may
ﬁnd it diﬃcult to resist the temptation to favour its own services
over that of a competitor, particularly where there are ﬁnancial
transfers within the structure which encourage it to behave in that
way.”
In this paper, we set up a simple model of competition in the rail market and
look at the desirability of separation vs integration, taking into account the fact
that railroads are a business with very high ﬁxed costs that need to be covered either
by transfers from the government or by access charges.
3 We stress an important
element that has been absent from the discussion: the costs of public funds. The
main ﬁnding is that separation is always welfare enhancing if ﬁx e dc o s t sc a nb e
ﬁnanced by costless transfers, but that this is no longer the case if transfers are
socially very expensive. Put diﬀerently, the beneﬁts of separation in terms of more
competition may conﬂict with another goal of reforms, namely, the stabilization of
budgets.
2According to the EU Directive 2001/14/EC there should be “open access” to national rail
infrastructures in the freight market beginning in 2007 and in the passenger market beginning in
2010.
3The report by NERA (2004) provides further information.1. INTRODUCTION 3
In our model, there is an integrated ﬁrm that provides infrastructure for its own
downstream operations. It also sells infrastructure access to a downstream com-
petitor. Throughout the paper we assume that downstream prices are unregulated,
which is in line with the way transportation markets function in most countries.
However, access prices may or may not be regulated.
In Section 2, we assume that access prices are unregulated. We show that the
incumbent’s incentives to foreclose the market are higher, the larger the degree
of substitution between the incumbent’s and the entrant’s downstream activities,
and the less eﬃcient the entrant. They are also more pronounced if only linear
access prices can be charged, rather than two-part tariﬀs. We do not claim much
originality for these results, rather the Section’s main goal is to provide a simple
framework for the analysis of the eﬀects of access price regulation, carried out in
Section 3.
In Section 3, we show that the desirability of vertical integration vs separation
depends on the cost of public funds. When transfers from the goverment to the
infrastructure provider are socially inexpensive and access prices can be below or
at marginal cost, then separation always dominates. Otherwise, integration may
be better from the point of view of society. The intuition for this result is that
a vertically integrated ﬁrm considers the true costs of infrastructure production,
rather than just a regulated access price. While non-integrated competitors reduce
their quantities when access prices are above marginal costs, this is not the case for
an integrated ﬁrm. Rather, the integrated ﬁrm expands its production, albeit not to
the point that it would fully compensate the reduction of quantity of the competitor.
Nonetheless, the negative eﬀect of higher access prices under integration is weaker
than under separation.
We believe that it is important to consider explicitely the tradeoﬀ between more
competition and higher transfers that we point to. Although it is certainly right that
separation of infrastructure from operations makes the sector more competitive, our
model shows that this may only be feasible, if the regulator is wealthy enough to
cover ﬁxed costs by sources that come from outside of the industry. However, it
may be quite costly to raise these sources. International estimates of the costs of
raising one Euro of public funds are between 30 cents for developped and more than
90 cents for less developped countries (see Auriol and Picard, 2004). The higher
the costs of public funds, the more ﬁxed costs must be covered through access
charges, and the less likely it is that there will be welfare gains when separation
takes place. Naturally, the tighter the budget constraint of a country, the more
one should expect that the costs of public funds matter in any regulatory decision
taken.
Section 3 has an additional result: If a regulator can use two-part access charges,
market structure does not matter any more, and in the absence of information asym-
metries, the ﬁrst best can be implemented through any market structure. Compared
to the case of linear access prices, the access charge and therefore downstream prices
are lower.
Our model is in line with the literature on access pricing and market structure
choice. Laﬀont and Tirole (1999) propose a Ramsey-Boiteux access price regulation
as the second-best solution when direct and costless transfers from the regulator
are not possible. This implies that infrastructure ﬁxed costs are ﬁnanced through
access charges. When access charges exceed the marginal cost, distortions in the4
downstream segment emerge. These can be minimized by access charges that dif-
ferentiate between operators, such that services that are more price-sensitive or
more elastic have a lower mark-up than services that are more demand-inelastic.
In Laﬀont and Tirole (1999), ﬁrms have no downstream market power, but the main
results hold if there is market power. Then, the access charge is used to trade oﬀ
ﬁnancing the ﬁxed cost and reducing downstream distortion. This is a very similar
trade-oﬀ to the one present in our model, and in our model, similar conclusions
hold concerning the usefulness of access charge diﬀerentiation.
4
Vickers (1995) focuses on the compromise between eﬃcient downstream pricing
and excessive entry, using access charge and market structure (vertical integration
or separation) as instruments to regulate the level of downstream entry in the mar-
k e t . I nh i sm o d e le n t r yi sf r e ea sl o n ga sﬁrms can pay the ﬁxed cost of entry.
Therefore the number of downstream operators is endogenously determined by the
magnitude of the ﬁxed cost, the regulated access charge and the chosen market
structure. As in our model, there is no regulation in the downstream segment.
Higher access charges makes entry more diﬃcult, leading to higher consumer prices
but preventing duplication of ﬁxed costs. In the framework of symmetric informa-
tion, Vickers ﬁnds that under vertical integration, access charges are higher than
under separation. This discourages entry without distorting too much the operat-
ing market, for the same reason as in our model: the integrated company considers
the real cost of access when setting its downstream price.
5
While in Vickers (1995) model the concern is excessive entry, in the railroad
sector, it is rather the lack of competition. Hence, in our model there is a diﬀerent
eﬀect of vertical integration: it leads to less competition than separation, but it also
involves less subsidisation. We look explicitely at how the budgetary constraints of
ag o v e r n m e n ta ﬀects - through the choice of integration vs separation - competition
in the market. To that extent our paper complements Auriol and Picard (2004) who
look at the impact of budgetary constraints on privatisation policies in development
economies.
In the last section, we briely discuss the implications of our model for EU
reforms and the reforms in the Russian railroads. We also discuss information
asymmetries between regulator and ﬁrms that are not discussed in the model, but
certainly of high importance.
2. Foreclosure in the absence of regulation
We ﬁrst investigate a vertically integrated ﬁrm’s incentives to foreclose the
entry of a downstream competitor. We identify the circumstances under which
foreclosure is more or less likely and examine the eﬀects of diﬀerent instruments of
the vertically integrated ﬁrm, that is, linear vs non-linear access charges.
2.1. Linear access charge. In our model the vertically integrated ﬁrm, the
incumbent, faces a potential entrant in the downstream market. Downstream ﬁrms
are engaged in Cournot competition, that is, they simultaneously decide on how
4We are not the ﬁrst who ﬁnd that access price diﬀerentiation may be useful in covering
railroad ﬁxed costs - see Pittmann (2004).
5Armstrong, Cowan and Vickers (1997) investigate cases where demand speciﬁcations lead to
optimal access charges larger than the marginal cost of access (a ≥ c). Then, vertical integration
tends to dominate separation. The opposite result holds if the optimal access charge is below the
marginal cost of access: separation then dominates integration.2. FORECLOSURE IN THE ABSENCE OF REGULATION 5
much quantity to put on the market, in the case of railroads, frequency and capacity
of trains.
Notice that this setting is in line with the plans of the European Commission
to provide non-discriminatory access in the freight market. There are also plans to
transform European long-haul passenger traﬃci na no p e nm a r k e tl i k et h eG e r m a n
one. The setting is however less applicable to subsidized local traﬃc, where there
is only competition for the market (through franchise contracts) but not in the
market. Moreover, prices are regulated by the procurement agency.
Downstream operators need access to track and other infrastructure. We as-
sume that operators need one unit of infrastructure capacity for each unit of ﬁnal
good. The integrated incumbent ﬁrm has two sources of revenues: from selling in-
frastructure access and from downstream operations. From the perspective of the
incumbent, the entrant is a buyer upstream, but a competitor downstream. The
incumbent chooses access charges taking in account their eﬀect on both revenue
sources, which makes the analysis non-trivial.
We model this decision as a two-stage process where, ﬁrst, the incumbent de-
cides on the access price to infrastructure, a, and then, knowing a, the two ﬁrms
compete in quantities as described above. We deﬁne Bi (qi,q j) as the gross beneﬁt
of the each downstream operator. The integrated ﬁrm maximizes:
(2.1) max
q1
Π1 = B1 (q1,q 2) − C(q1,q 2)+aq2.
Here C(q1,q 2) is the cost function of providing infrastructure access given the traﬃc
volume of the two downstream ﬁrms. The entrant maximizes:
(2.2) max
q2
Π2 = B2 (q2,q 1) − aq2.
Notice the diﬀerence in the proﬁt functions of the incumbent and the entrant.
Across ﬁrms the transaction occurs through the access charge (aq2), but inside
the integrated ﬁrm, transactions have a diﬀerent nature. As shown before, the
integrated ﬁrm takes into account the eﬀect on the global proﬁt of the integrated
company in all its decisions, for instance, when choosing the access charge. This is
in line with previous literature, for instance, Vickers (1995).
Proceeding by backward induction, we solve ﬁrst the competition equilibrium







=0 , for the incumbent,
∂B2
∂q2
− a =0 ,for the entrant. (2.3)
From this, we obtain the quantities oﬀered by each operator as a function of
the access charge: {q∗
1(a),q∗
2(a)}.
In the ﬁrst stage, the incumbent sets a in order to maximize :
(2.4) max



























































Equation (5) identiﬁes the two eﬀects that drive the incumbent’s choice of the
access price. What we call the “upstream” eﬀect is similar to any other monop-
oly selling a good to a buyer, in our case, the entrant. The second term, the
“downstream eﬀect”, captures the eﬀect of entry on the downstream proﬁts of the
incumbent. Whether or not the incumbent asks a higher price than in a standard
unrelated market monopoly setting depends on the sign of the downstream eﬀect.
When the goods are substitutes,
∂B1
∂q2
< 0; also, as
∂q2
∂a
> 0, the downstream eﬀect
is positive. Increasing a then increases the proﬁts of the incumbent, and the price
the incumbent asks is higher than it would be in a situation of unrelated markets.
The incumbent here uses a higher access price to make the entrant less competitive
and to protect his downstream proﬁts. This eﬀect is larger, the more substitutable
the goods are, that is, the larger the “business-stealing” eﬀect of the entrant.




=0 . Then, the optimal access charge (aM) is set in away that the
competitor can enter the market. When the stealing eﬀect increases, the optimal
choice of a increases as well. As the access charge departs form aM, the proﬁts
extracted from the entrant decreases, but it is compensated by avoiding losses in
the downstream market. When the business stealing eﬀect is very large, it may be
in the interest of the incumbent to set a as big as possible or equivalently to deny
the access.6
If services are complements, however, the term is negative and in consequence
the incumbent would want to encourage the entrant to increase his supply. Thus,
the incumbent would charge an access price below the one that the upstream ﬁrm
in case of separation would charge.
Whether train services are substitutes or complements to each other is not
always a simple question. In particular, it depends on whether an entrant feeds new
traﬃc in the system, either directly, into existing connections of the incumbent, or
by making rail in general a more competitive option in intermodal competition. In
case the incumbent operates a network of origin-destination nodes, it has to take
in account the net impact of the new service provided by the entrant in the whole
network.
7
Besides the level of diﬀerentiation among products, there is a second force that
is important for the incumbent’s access price setting behavior: the eﬃciency of a
potential entrant. When the entrant has high marginal operating costs or high cost




7In equation 2 the term
∂B1
∂q2
has to be replaced by
i=1,n S ∂Bi
∂q2
.where i is the index of services
or routes oﬀered by the incumbent.2. FORECLOSURE IN THE ABSENCE OF REGULATION 7
of entry, the proﬁts that the incumbent can extract trough access charges are low
and it is less attractive for the incumbent to provide the entrant with access. The
upstream eﬀects becomes negligeable, the downstream eﬀects dominates and the
incumbent will have more incentives to foreclose the access.
A ﬁnal observation. Assume that the incumbent does not want to block entry



















≤ 0 represents the elasticity of the entrant’s demand for in-
frastructure input with respect to the access price. The value of a∗ depends posi-
tively on the marginal cost of access and on the level of substitution among services,
and negatively on the elasticity of demand for access to the infrastructure.
This expression for a∗ has some similarity with the “ECPR” formula originally
developed by Willig (1979) and popularized by Baumol (1983), which can be writ-






. The Eﬃcient Component Price Rule, often used by
courts and regulators in order to determine the “fair” access charge to a bottleneck
asset states that the access charge to an essential facility shall be equal to the cost
of providing access plus the incumbent’s forgone proﬁt in the downstream market
caused by the entrant. The ECPR access charge takes in account the entire oppor-
tunity cost that entry causes to the incumbent, but does not allow for monopoly
pricing. The diﬀerence between a∗ and aECPR is the denominator of equation (6),
which corresponds to the extraction of monopoly proﬁts applied by the incumbent.
Notice that the unregulated access charge, a∗,i sa l w a y sl o w e rt h a naECPR,a sεa
≤ 0.
2.2. Two-part tariﬀs. We here allow for schemes of the type (a,T).I ft h e
entrant accepts, both ﬁrms compete using quantities as instrument. The proﬁt
function for the incumbent is:
Π1 = B1 (q1,q 2) − C(q1,q 2)+T + aq2
and for the entrant:
Π2 = B2 (q2,q 1) − T − aq2
Since T is given at the second stage, the optimal choice of qi of both ﬁrms yields
the same result as in the case of linear charges. Thus, knowing q∗
1(a) and q∗
2(a),the
incumbent makes his optimal choice of a and T at stage one. If the integrated ﬁrm
wants the entrant to be in the market it ﬁxes T such that:
Π2 = B2 (q∗
2 (a),q∗
1 (a)) − T − aq∗
2 (a)=0 ⇒
T∗ = B2 (q∗
2 (a),q∗
1 (a)) − aq∗
2 (a)
which implies that the incumbent, if it has perfect information, can extract the
entire surplus form the entrant.8










We can re-write this as:
Π1 (a)=Π1 + Π2





































Compared to the case of linear access charges there is now a new term in the
derivative, which corresponds to the eﬀect of the access charge in the proﬁts of
the competitor. Using the ﬁxed charge T, the incumbent can extract the entrant’s
proﬁts, and there is less of an incentive to make the entrant less competitive by
using a higher a. If under linear tariﬀ t h ei n c u m b e n ta l l o w se n t r y ,t h es a m ew i l l
be true under two-part tariﬀs. The same eﬀects that make foreclosure more likely
under linear tariﬀs will also be present under two-part tariﬀs, but their intensity is
diminished. The business stealing eﬀect is less harmful to the incumbent as part of
the proﬁts that the entrant takes away from the incumbent can be recouped trough
the ﬁxed charge T. In terms on the eﬀect to downstream consumers, since entry is
more likely to take place with two part tariﬀs, they will beneﬁt more and also they
will enjoy lower prices.8
3. Access charge regulation
We ﬁrst assume that the regulator uses only two instruments: A linear access
charge a paid by the entrant to the incumbent and a transfer T1 paid by the
regulator to the incumbent. As we will see, the need for this direct transfer T1 is
owing to the presence of imperfect competition downstream and to covering ﬁxed
costs of infrastructure. We then look at a regulator who can use two-part access
tariﬀs and can thus extract the surplus from the downstream operators. We also
show that whether or not a regulator wants vertical integration depends on the
shadow costs of public funds, that is, how costly is for the government to subsidize
the industry.
3.1. Linear access charge and transfers to infrastructure provider.
Using the same model as above we introduce some simpliﬁcations. The cost function
of the incumbent for providing infrastructure is equal to CU = K +c(q1 +q2),with
K the ﬁxed and c the unit-variable part of the costs. As before, q1 and q2 are
the quantities supplied downstream by each operator. The cost of operation in the
ﬁnal market - besides the cost of access - is zero for both downstream ﬁrms. The
downstream demand for transport services is represented by the linear function:
Q(P)=θ − νP, where P is the ﬁnal consumer price. The total quantity supplied
downstream is Q = q1 + q2 which implies that the products are homogeneous.
8For any optimal a∗ to be applied in the case of linear access charge, the solution (in terms
of proﬁts to the incumbent) can be replicated with an access charge a0 and a ﬁxed charge T0 such
that a0 ≤ a∗.3. ACCESS CHARGE REGULATION 9
The regulator ﬁxes access price a and makes a transfer T to the incumbent with
the purpose of maximizing social welfare under the constraint that the upstream
monopolist has to break even. Transfers are costly: raising public funds is associated
with deadweight losses that are represented by λ ≥ 0. The consumer surplus of
downstream services is denoted by S (Q),with S0 (Q) ≥ 0 and S00 (Q) ≤ 0. As
before, there is no downstream price or quantity regulation.
The regulator maximizes:
(3.1) Max: W = S (q1 + q2) − c(q1 + q2) − K − λT
subject to the following constraints:
(1) Break-even condition for the bottleneck:
ΠU = T +( a − c)(q1 + q2) − K ≥ 0.
(2) Only positive transfers :
T ≥ 0
(3) Downstream Cournot competition:
(3.2) q1 = q1 (a),q 2 = q2 (a)= ⇒ q1 + q2 = Q(a)
Notice ﬁrst that in equilibrium, the ﬁrst constraint will be satisﬁed with equality
as increasing transfers or access charges above break-even level is costlyto society.
The second constraint rules out that the industry can be taxed to ﬁnance the public
budget. The third condition states that downstream production is aﬀected by the
choice of access price and hence also on the structure of the industry, i.e. whether
there is vertical integration or separation.
Replacing the ﬁrst constraint into the regulator’s program, we obtain:
(3.3) W = S (Q) − (1 + λ)cQ + λaQ − (1 + λ)K, with Q ≡ Q(a)
Optimizing with respect to a yields:





The interpretation of equation (10) is as follows: When transfers from the
government are not costly (λ =0 ) , the optimal price is equal to the marginal cost
of services c. In this case, downstream quantities are ﬁrst best. Recall that ﬁrms
have market power in the downstream segment. In order to induce the ﬁrms to
charge P = c rather than P (a) ≥ a, the regulator subsidizes the access charges
downstream operators pay (a ≤ c). The losses of the upstream division are covered
by T that is, a lump sum transfer. Here, T covers both the ﬁxed cost and the
diﬀerence (c − a)Q.
However, for values of λ>0, the equilibrium price increases because the regu-
lator dislikes paying subsidies and uses access charges also to fund the ﬁxed costs of
infrastructure. In general, the optimal access charge is a trade-oﬀ between paying
transfers with public funds and decreasing downstream consumption (by increasing
the access charge).
To see this graphically, we deﬁne iso-welfare curves in the (Q,a) space. Looking
at the objective function, equation (7), it is clear that at a given level of Q,w e l f a r e10
is increasing in a because it demands lower amount of public funds, and at a given
level of a,welfare is increasing in Q.9
In order to ﬁnd the optimum pair of quantity supplied and access charge
(Q∗,a ∗) we need to introduce the downstream competition condition. We have
two possible market structures:
i) Vertical Separation. Here, both ﬁrms face the same marginal cost of input equal









Here, there is no longer symmetry in the downstream market. The integrated
ﬁrm faces a marginal cost of c, while the competitor has a marginal cost equal to








(A − b(2a − c)) =⇒ QI (a)=
1
3
(2A − b(c + a)),for the entrant.
The two market structures are represented in the (Q,a) space by a straight
line. Is easy to check that the slope of the QS (a) respect to a is steeper than the
slope of QI (a). Also we have:
QS (a =0 ) ≥ QI (a =0 ) and
QS (a = c)=QI (a = c).
Putting together the iso-welfare curves and the quantities into one graph:
We observe that ﬁrst, when the optimal a∗ is larger than c,w e l f a r ei sh i g h e r
under vertical integration than under separation. In the graph, this represented by
the tangency point of the iso-welfare curves Wi with QS and QI.
Second, whether a∗ is larger or smaller than c is endogenous to the parameters
of the model. In particular, it depends on λ: For higher shadow values of the public
funds, the iso-welfare curves are steeper and the optimal points are located more
to the south-east direction of the graph. Put diﬀerently, for higher λ, the regulator
must increase a to ﬁnance the infrastructure. This, reduces Q as downstream ﬁrms
contract their supply.
Solving for both market structures yields:
aI =
A[2λ − 1/3] + 2/3cb
b(2λ +1 /3)





A[λ − 1/3] + (1 + λ)θb
2b(λ +1 /3)




Both aI and aS are increasing in λ and the total quantity Q is decreasing in λ
for both market structures. Notice also that QS ≥ QI for all λ ≥ 0.
Third, and most importantly, the above arguments imply that:


















Figure 1. Examples for equilibria under separation and integration
Proposition 1. There is some λ
∗ such that for λ>λ
∗ welfare is higher under
vertical integration and for λ<λ
∗ welfare is higher under separation.
As an example, suppose that λ = 1
3, then aS = c and aI ≥ c which implies that
welfare under integration is higher than under separation since the tangency point
is below the intersection of the lines QI and QS. Now, if λ = 1
6,t h e naI = c and
aS ≥ c. Then, welfare with separation is higher than integration, which also holds
for any λ ≤ 1







∗). Figure 2 plots this situation in which the same
iso-welfare curve is tangent to the supply curves of integration and separation.
From our simple model we can extract the following conclusion: The choice
of market structure depends on the cost of the transfers that the regulator pays
to the upstream monopolist. For high values of λ, funding of the infrastructure
will be mainly by access charge. These access charges distort the downstream
market because the operating companies take in account their cost when deciding
their quantities. This distortion is mitigated through vertical integration since
the integrated ﬁrm tends to produce more when rival cost increases. However,
this increased production does not oﬀset the decreased production of the non-
integrated ﬁrm, and the net eﬀect in the total quantity supplied is lower when




∂a ≥ 0). Hence, if λ is low enough,
vertical separation is desirable: When access can be subsidized (a ≤ c), there is
more intensive downstream competition and there are higher quantities. In turn,
for λ high enough, vertical integration is desirable. Put diﬀerently: the larger the
fraction of infrastructure ﬁxed costs that must be paid by users, the more likely

























Figure 3. Separation equilibrium dominates integration
3.2. Two-part access tariﬀs. We now allow for the regulator to also impose
transfers T1 and T2 from each downstream operator in order to make the upstream
division break-even. The potential beneﬁt of this additional instrument is the saving
in public funds that are going to be replaced by the proﬁts of the two operators.4. IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUDING DISCUSSION 13
The regulator maximizes:
Max : W = S (q1 + q2) − c(q1 + q2) − K − λT
s.t.
ΠU = T + T1 + T2 +( a − θ)(q1 + q2) − K ≥ 0
Πi =( P − a)qi − Ti ≥ 0 for i =1 ,2
As it is never optimal to leave rents to downstream ﬁrms, (either because then,
the transfers from the government could be reduced or because one could further
decrease the access price), the constraints can be pooled into what we call the
“industry feasibility constraint”:
Π = T +( P − c)(q1 + q2) − K =0
Replacing the industry feasibility constraint the regulator’s program becomes:
Max : W = S (Q) − (1 + λ)cQ + λP (Q)Q − (1 + λ)K
s.t. Q = Q(a)
This programme diﬀers from the one in which downstream ﬁrms cannot be
charged lump-sum transfers as the rents that can be extracted from the industry
change from λaQ to λPQ. Provided that P (a) ≥ a, we can infer that the welfare
is higher when the regulator can employ two part tariﬀs for the access charge.
Solving the maximization program, and replacing S0 (Q) by P(Q) yields
P = c − P0 (Q)Q
λ
1+λ
As before, when λ =0 , we can set the price equal to marginal cost of the service
and pay all the ﬁxed cost K with a costless transfer from the government. The most
important implication is that the optimal solution is independent from a, that is, the
optimum can be implemented through both market structures, vertical integration
or separation. Access charges and lump sum transfers will vary according to each
case, but the total quantity oﬀered downstream and the transfer to be paid to
the incumbent will be the same. Hence, if it is possible to use two-part tariﬀs,
the competitive distortions that are present under linear access charges can be
eliminated.
4. Implications and concluding discussion
Our simple model generate two insights: First, while in the absence of perfect
regulation separation of infrastructure from operations does increase competition
and hence induces more traﬃc, it is also more expensive in terms of subsidies.
Second, if the regulator can use two-part access charges, market structure does
not matter, and in the absence of information asymmetries, the ﬁrst best can be
implemented through any market structure. Compared to the case of linear access
prices, the access charge and therefore downstream prices are lower.
The model shows that there does not seem to be a “one-size-ﬁts-all solution”
to the problem of restructuring of network industries. Indeed, a casual look at
the experience in the railroad industry shows that most railroad ﬁrms operate as
integrated ﬁrms, the Class 1 freight companies in the US to a similar extent as
the regional passenger companies in Japan. The experience from other industries
conﬁrms this view. There is a huge variety across countries concerning the deregu-
lation policies of network industries, and in particular, conncerning the separation14
or integration of upstream and downstream activities. British Gas was fully priva-
tized as a vertically integrated ﬁrm in 1986, but provisions were taken to facilitate
entry (access price regulation, marketshare cap). In the US electricity market, reg-
ulatory power resides at the state level. Across states there coexist many regimes
from vertically integrated monopolies to mandatory separation between generation
and transmission. In the UK, generation of electricty was separated but vertical
integration between transmission and distribution was maintained.
It appears that the desirability of separation of infrastructure from downstream
operations is determined by other things than only the concerns for downstream
competition. Otherwise, we should indeed see one dominating reform model. There
are reasons we have not considered in this paper: Integrated ﬁrms may be more
eﬃcient because they have lower transaction costs (Williamson, 1987). They also
may ﬁnd it easier to coordinate day-to-day operations or have better incentives for
large investment projects (Aghion and Tirole, 1997, Baake et al. 2004). Rather, we
have pointed out that even in the absence of these reasons, a regulator may choose
to maintain ﬁrms integrated for reasons of budgetary constraints.
There are a number of implications of the model for the rail reforms in the
EU. First, in our model, as in Vicker’s (1995), the so-called “level playing ﬁeld
principle” is not necessarily optimal. Otherwise vertical separation would always
be at least as good as integration. Rather, if subsidies are very expensive, regulators
may decide to maintain integration, because the integrated ﬁrm takes into account
the real cost of access c rather than the higher access price a. Notice that the
non-level playing ﬁeld (a 6= c) can also play against the incumbent. A “wealthy”
regulator who faces small costs of public funds may decide to subsidize access to
the bottleneck (a ≤ c). Lee and Hamilton (1999) extend Vickers model, adding
asymmetry in terms of downstream eﬃciency between the incumbent and entrants.
The main insights is that separation becomes more desirable when entrants have
lower marginal cost than the incumbent in the downstream segment. This is also
possible in our model, but involves more costly subsidies, here for entrants.
The second implication concerns the usefulness of two part tariﬀs. If a regulator
can use two-part tariﬀs, distortions in the downstream market can be mitigated.
Pittmann (2004) has argued before that it may be unwise to forbid price discrimina-
tion as this makes it more diﬃcult to cover ﬁxed costs. In our model, not allowing
these tariﬀs would indeed increase subsidies or create the very downstream distor-
tions that regulators try to avoid by assuring discrimination-free entry.
What are the limitations of our simple model? The most important one is
that we have not looked at the role of asymmetric information. When the cost of
access is private information of the upstream ﬁrm, vertical separation may be more
desirable. To see why, consider that only the incumbent knows the true costs of
access. According to the revelation principle of incentive theory, the regulator has
to elicit this information in order to optimize social welfare. However, the owner
of the bottleneck asset would like to increase proﬁts from selling access and hence
would want to overstate costs. The regulator hence must leave the incumbent ﬁrms
some rents to reveal the true costs. Under vertical integration these rents are larger
than under separation. Here, the incumbent would like to further overstate the
true costs of infrastructure in order to increase his downstream competitor’s costs,4. IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUDING DISCUSSION 15
and hence be, himself, more competitive.10 An optimal regulatory contract thus
has to leave larger rents (larger transfers) to an integrated ﬁrm than to a non-
integrated infrastructure provider. This makes access more costly, and hence there
is less quantity downstream. Put diﬀerently, asymmetry of information may bend
the trade-oﬀ in favor of vertical separation.
The trade-oﬀ we point out is nonetheless still present, unless informational
rents are too large. If the additional informational rents that the regulator needs
to pay to an integrated ﬁrm are very large, separation may not only dominate
from the point of view of increasing competition, but also from a budgetary point
of view. Informational rents increase with the uncertainty about true costs. It is
hence important to increase cost transparency, which has been one of the goals of
the 1991 EU Directive. National railroad companies had to separate the accounts
for infrastructure from the ones for operations. Most of the ﬁrms have implemented
separate accounts in the meantime. This does not eliminate information asymmetry
altogether, but it certainly mitigates the problem.
The model has more implications for the current reform discussion in the EU.
It is often believed regulators can kill two birds with the stone of more intramodal
competition: First, by stimulating competition, more traﬃc would use railroads
rather than roads, which would be good for the environment (and consumers).
Second, more competitive pressure would force incumbent rail operators to be more
eﬃcient, and would hence reduce the burden railroad cause for the budget of the
EU member states.
Our model sheds doubt on this belief. Stimulating competition may involve
more rather than less subsidies. However, intermodal competition does not have
the same kind of negative budgetary consequences. Throughout the last few years
there has been massive entry of low-cost airlines in Europe and a recent case study
shows that this had massive eﬀects on the market for rail transportation as well
(Friebel and Niﬀka, 2004). Given that intermodal competition seems to be quite
eﬀective, it is an important question whether it is socially valuable to increase
subsidies in order to increase intramodal competition.
Finally the model also has interesting implications for emerging economies such
as Russia. The Russian reform plan builds on similar blocks as reforms in the
EU. In particular, it stipulates the separation of infrastructure from operations
in order to increase competition. There are a number of reasons to be sceptical
about this plan (see Cheviakhova et al., 2004). In particular, Russia is dependent
on rail transportation to a much larger extent than any EU country: railroads
account for close to one half of the passenger traﬃc and close to 80% of freight.
In the light of our model, there is an additional concern about the usefulness of
the experiment “infrastructure separation”. This concern is related to the fact that
the ﬁscal performance of Russia is low, that is, the costs of raising public funds
are high. It may turn out that separation of infrastructure from operations would
indeed involve a reduction of traﬃc or the necessity to increase subsidies (or both).
The consequence would be to accept for railroads what has happened in many
industries in transition economies: double marginalization and output fall.11 As
the Russian government may ﬁnd it even harder than the EU to raise additional
10In an oligopoly model like ours, the proﬁts of one ﬁrm are increasing with the marginal
cost of the rivals.
11Blanchard and Kremer (1997) call this “disorganization”.16
public funds, it may be even harder to correct such an outcome. The beneﬁts of
maintaining integration may hence be larger than usually expected.Part 2
Vertical Integration in the Rail
Industry: What can Economics
Teach Us?
12
12I thank Jacques Crémer, Markus Ksoll and Michael Raith for their comments. All errors
are my own.5. Introduction
In railways as in many other network industries, liberalisation and privatisation
involve an important question: should one separate infrastructure from operations,
or should the components of the value chain remain integrated, at least for the
main national operator? As so often in economics, there is not one single, correct,
answer to this question. Experience shows that there is a wide range of institu-
tional solutions, but in many industries and countries, integration appears to be the
predominant organisational solution (Knowledge Center Amsterdam, 2003). This
is particularly true in the railroad industry; in most parts of the world, railroads
are vertically integrated companies (Cheviakhova et al, 2004). However, in Europe
there is an ongoing discussion about the costs and beneﬁts of vertical separation.
In Germany, the issue is particularly interesting and important. German Gov-
ernment plans to privatise Deutsche Bahn in the near future, but it is an open
question whether operations will be privatised in an integrated way, i.e. together
with infrastructure, or in a separated way.
Economic theory tells us that the decision of separating infrastructure from
operations depends crucially on two potentially conﬂicting forces. On the one
hand, integrated ﬁrms may abuse market power. In particular, competitors of,
say, Deutsche Bahn may fear that an integrated ﬁrm does not provide them with
access to tracks in a fair, that is, non-discriminatory way. On the other hand, co-
ordination of economic activities may be more eﬃcient in an integrated ﬁrm. This
is related to the idea that it is costly to coordinate economic activities by contracts
across the boundaries of the ﬁrms, and that coordination within the boundaries of
the ﬁr mc a nb em o r ee ﬃcient.
This paper focuses on this second argument, which is the subject of transaction
cost economics and was pioneered by Coase (1937) and Williamson (1971). The
goal of the paper is twofold: ﬁrst, to review theory and empirical work in trans-
action cost economics that is relevant for evaluating the potential coordination
beneﬁts of vertical integration; second, to provide a framework for identiﬁcation
and presentation of case studies from Deutsche Bahn.
I ﬁrst describe the analytical and conceptual framework of transaction cost
economics. Section 6 argues that the formalized theoretical literature has much
concentrated on the capacity of diﬀerent ownership forms to provide investment
incentives. However, day-to-day coordination and adjustment processes may be
equally important as investment incentives. This point, which is also present in
Williamson’s original writing has recently received more attention by a growing
theoretical literature on vertical integration, which we look at in Section 7. It may
be particularly relvant for an industry like railroads, with its complex technology
and the large number of actors involved. Detailed and well-structured cases could
contribute to the scientiﬁc discussion and help generate better knowledge about the
beneﬁts of infrastructure integration. To get some inspiration for such case study
work, Section 8 brieﬂy reviews relevant empirical work from other industries that
tries to test transaction cost economics.
6. Transaction cost economics: origin, concepts, insights
Transaction costs economics goes back to the famous, Nobel-prize winning arti-
cle of Coase (1937). Coase introduced the idea that — in contrast to what is assumed
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price system and in the market place is not costless. More precisely, he identiﬁes
two major sources of costs of coordination in the market: a) discovering what the
relevant prices are (ex ante learning); b) the “costs of negotiating and concluding
a separate contract for each exchange transaction which takes place on a market”
(page 390). According to Coase, the allocation of authority through vertical in-
tegration can help ﬁr m st os a v eo nt h ec o s t so fb ) ,t h a ti s ,t h ec o s t so fa g r e e i n g
on the terms of trade of a good (“by forming an organisation and allowing some
authority to direct the resources, certain market costs can be saved”). On page
391, he deﬁnes authority: “a factor (a worker, for instance, GF) agrees for a certain
remuneration to obey the directives of an entrepreneur within certain limits.” He
also points to the cost of organisation in particular the diseconomies of scale in
administration, and the risk of potential misallocation of authority.
Williamson (1971) and his following work develop these thoughts further
towards a modern theory of the ﬁrm. Williamson identiﬁes three forces that cause
transaction costs. First, individuals are subject to bounded rationality — they are
limited in their capacity to foresee and plan for the future. Hence contingencies
may arise that have not been planned for in a contract. Second, there are limits
to communication between economic agents; this also imposes constraints on the
completeness of contracts. Third, even if the ﬁrst two problems could be overcome,
there are limits to which a third party (a court or a mediator) would understand
the agreements between two parties, making it diﬃcult to enforce these agreements
according to the initial understanding of the contracting parties.
In the presence of transaction costs, contracts are necessarily incomplete.
Consider that two parties ﬁnd themselves in a situation (“state of nature”) about
which the contract is silent or unclear. Consider further that there is value in
staying in this relationship, but the contract does not stipulate how this value
(“surplus”) should be shared. We then talk about a situation of ex post (that is
after the parties have contracted an potentially invested in a relationship) quasi-
rents. These quasi-rents may give rise to the so-called hold-up problem: one or both
parties have incentives to “haggle”, i.e. to invest eﬀort and resources to acquire
a larger share of the surplus. This is certainly ineﬃcient as it diverts the parties’
attention from more productive use, delays agreements etc.
Williamson argues that “internal organization attenuates the aggressive advo-
cacy that epitomizes arm’s length bargaining” and introduces the term “intraorga-
nizational settlements by ﬁat (=authority, GF)”. He believes that ﬁat is frequently
am o r ee ﬃcient way to settle conﬂicts than haggling and litigation. In a nutshell,
managers through their authority in ﬁrms can be more eﬃcient arbiters than judges.
However, there are costs of vertical integration, in particular that incentives in ﬁrms
are usually weaker than the incentives the market provides.
Williamson and related scholars have then further developed this positive the-
ory in order to explain why certain structures have evolved and why enforcement
within the boundaries of ﬁrms can be more eﬃcient (less costly) than across the
boundaries of ﬁrms. While we are far from having a ﬁnal answer to this question,
it is probably fair to say that in the opinion of transaction cost economics, vertical
integration would be more likely to be eﬃcient if the quasi-rents are bigger (that
is, when investments are rather speciﬁc to the relationship of two or more parties),
when transaction between two or more parties are frequent, and outcomes are more
uncertain (see Section 8 for a short overview on empirical work).20
One of the arguable weaknesses of transaction cost economics has been its lack
of formalization. It is hence not surprising that the so-called property rights theory
of Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1991) has had major success,
as it takes up the idea of incomplete contracts and provides elegant models of the
eﬀect of ownership on eﬃciency. Here, ownership (property rights) are seen as a
way to allocate decision rights that are not stipulated by contract (“residual rights
of control”).
The theory posits that ex post any two parties will always manage to agree
to maximize the surplus associated with their relationship. The parties involved
bargain ex post over the surplus that is associated with their relationship (the quasi-
r e n t s )a n dt h e yd os oi na ne ﬃc i e n tw a y ;n o n eo ft h es u r p l u si sd e s t r o y e di nt h e
process of negotiations. The allocation of bargaining power between two parties,
however, depends on who owns the assets; the party that is the owner can threaten
to withdraw the assets from the relationship, making it possible for them to acquire
larger parts of the surplus.
While diﬀerent ownership agreements are hence neutral with respect to ex post
eﬃciency, they do have an impact on ex ante eﬃciency. At the time when two
parties enter a contract and when ownership entitlements are allocated (e.g., party
A sells an asset to party B), both parties anticipate the possibility of ex post bar-
gaining. The parties also anticipate that the party who is the owner of a certain
asset will have more bargaining power in those states of nature the contract is
silent about. However, if in a subset of situations, the owner will acquire more of
the surplus, and the party that does not own assets less, then the incentives of the
non-owner to invest in the asset will be smaller and the investment incentives of the
owner will be larger, compared to a situation of joint ownership. Ownership hence
provides incentives to parties, and its allocation should depend on the importance
of various parties’ inputs and eﬀorts. In general, we would expect that the more
important a party’s eﬀo r t ,t h em o r el i k e l yi ts h o u l db et oh a v eo w n e r s h i pr i g h t s .
7. Investment incentives or day-to-day coordination and adjustment?
Much of the theoretical literature following Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart
and Moore (1991) have focused on the question how ownership arrangements can
mitigate the ex ante problem of underinvestment. However, Whinston (2003) argues
convincingly that it is hard to empirically test the predictions of the property right
theory concerning ex ante incentives. It is hence not surprising that more recently,
a number of authors have advocated a shift of theorists’ attention back to the ex
post costs as determinants of vertical integration.
Three recent papers further build on these insights and discuss issues of ex
post coordination and adjustment: Gertner (2002), Wernerfelt (2004) and Gibbons
(2004). Gertner (2002) looks at a situation in which two units produce inputs that
can be combined to a certain output. There are ex ante unforeseen or indescribable
events. If such an event occurs, the most valuable output can only be produced if
both inputs are provided. If the two units are independent ﬁrms, one of them may
then have an incentive to haggle: they may spend resources on trying to appropriate
a larger share of the output, threatening to otherwise use their input for production
of the initially agreed upon type of output. In this situation, vertical integration
can be helpful. If the two units are not independent ﬁrms, but divisions of the same
ﬁrm, top management can use his authority to prevent such haggling. The problem8. EMPIRICAL WORK 21
with the argument is, of course, that both division managers may try to inﬂuence
top management’s decision, a problem that has been analysed by Milgrom and
Roberts (1988, 1990). Ultimately, as Gibbons (2004) points out, one would hence
need a more general theory that would allow comparing the costs of haggling within
and across the boundaries of ﬁrms.
Wernerfelt’s (2004) paper builds on the simple insight that parties can choose
how to govern adjustments of their (production, consumption or supply) plans. He
compares three potential adjustment mechanisms: ﬁrst, negotiation of adjustments
when they come up; second, advance agreement how to handle future adjustments;
third, agreement to leave the stipulation of adjustments to one of the two parties.
While the ﬁrst mechanism can be understood as a spot contract, and the second as
some binding long-term contract, the third one builds on the notion of authority.
Here, one party transfers their authority of handling adjustments to another party.
For instance, one party, say “the worker”, may sign an employment contract with
another party, “the manager”, or a ﬁrm’s owner may sell his assets to another ﬁrm
that will then have authority about what to do with the assets.
Rather than presenting a fully closed and resolved model, Wernerfelt’s paper
provides a broad discussion of the costs and beneﬁts of authority in deciding on
adjustment. For our purpose, the most important point is that under vertical inte-
gration, adjustments will be taken faster and will fail less often. This is intuitively
clear, but also supported by an important ﬁnding from bargaining theory: Myerson
and Satterthwaite (1983) have shown that bargaining between two parties may fail
if both parties have private information, i.e., if there is a situation of bilateral in-
formation asymmetry. Giving one party authority over adjustment decisions, rules
out this kind of bargaining break-down because the parties cannot agree on what to
do. In terms of the costs of authority allocation (vertical integration), Wernerfelt
is less explicit. In particular, he points to the potentially lower incentives.
Finally, Gibbons’ (2004) paper provides an interesting overview of a number of
transaction cost theories of vertical integration we have discussed above (property
right, adjustment, rent-seeking). Most interestingly, he argues that ultimately,
theory would have to take to account that it is a short-cut to assume that haggling
(rent-seeking) between two economic agents would occur only between two non-
integrated ﬁrm. Rather, one would have to take into account the activities of
agents within a ﬁrm to inﬂuence an internal decision-maker, say, the CEO. This
has been subject of the papers by Milgrom and Roberts (1988) and (1990), and
Gibbons suggests a model that could compare the relative eﬃciency of integrated
vs non-integrated structures in dealing with these ineﬃciencies. However, he does
not provide a full solution, nor does he generate interpretable and testable results.
We can conclude that the literature seems to take a sharp turn and has refo-
cused on the ex post problems of haggling and maladjustment that could be quite
interesting for railroad economics. One should understand that we are quite far
from having one clear and generally accepted theory, but theory provides us with
inspiration to identify the most original and challenging case examples.
8. Empirical work
There are a number of by now classical papers that have attempted to test
the predictions of transaction cost economics. Whinston (2003) discusses three of
them: Monteverde and Teece (1984) look at the decisions of Ford and GM to have22
external suppliers produce car components, or to produce them in-house. They
ﬁnd evidence corroborating the view that transaction costs are important. In their
sample of 133 components, components that are very speciﬁc, i.e., that can be used
seldom outside GM or, respectively, Ford are more likely to be produced in-house.
Similarly those components that involve more development eﬀort by engineers are
produced in-house, presumably to mitigate the hold-up problem. Masten (1984)
looks at 1,887 components that are used by a large aerospace manufacturer and ﬁnds
that more specialized components and more complex components are produced in-
house. Joskow (1987) ﬁnds that electrical utility companies tend to have more
long-term relationships when coal mines are co-localized with the utilities, and
alternative coal suppliers are remote. Similar results from coking factories have
been obtained by Goldberg and Erickson (1987).
There is hence indeed support for the ideas of Williamson and other transac-
tion cost economists that there are beneﬁts in vertical integration and long-term
contracting when speciﬁcity is high and there are thus large quasi-rents and when
contracting is complex.
Gertner and Stillman (2001) oﬀer an interesting additional perspective on the
beneﬁts of vertical integration. They investigate to what extent diﬀerent ﬁrms in
the apparel (garment) industry were able to make use of the innovation “internet”.
They show that ﬁrms that were vertically integrated, that is, owned their own
distribution channels and retailers, managed to make use of the internet swifter,
had deeper and broader coverage, received better rankings for their website and had
more visitors than ﬁrms that were not integrated (for instance, department stores
and vendors). This result needs to be taken with a grain of salt, because one cannot
derive estimates of eﬃciency from quantitative or qualitative internet performance
indicators; for instance, it may be that integrated ﬁrms were just willing to invest
more money in their internet sites. Nonetheless, the results are interesting and in
line with some theoretical arguments. Gertner and Stillman identify three potential
reasons why vertically integrated ﬁrms may have outcompeted other ﬁrms in their
use of the internet.
First, ﬁrms that are not vertically integrated have “channel conﬂicts”, that is
when they decide to use the internet, they may get into conﬂicts with retailers of
department stores who fear additional competition. An integrated ﬁrm can handle
these conﬂicts in-house, and decide to look at the net eﬀe c to fi n t e r n e te x p a n s i o n
only, rather than having to argue with business partners whether or not the internet
would be too much competition for traditional retail channels.
More relevant for railroads are “externality problems”. A study of McKinsey
(cited in Gertner and Stillman) shows that the average gross margin on on-line
sales for manufacturers was 46% in 1999, while it was only 9% for multi-label re-
tailers. They hence have a lower incentive to invest in the internet. The problem
is exacerbated by the fear of free-riding. If a manufacturer invests in an internet
distribution channel that it does not own, and that is also used by other manufac-
turers, it fears that competitors beneﬁt, which reduces its investment incentives.
Finally, Gertner and Stillman point to coordination costs: in the absence of these
and other transaction costs (in particular those owing to information asymmetries),
none of the above would be a problem as one could write agreements between the
diﬀerent parties making sure that the joint surplus of diﬀerent manufacturers and9. CONCLUDING REMARKS: THE VALUE OF CASE STUDIES 23
retailers were maximized. However, when coordination costs are substantial, these
agreements fail to be taken or they are sub-optimal.
9. Concluding remarks: the value of case studies
Economists have been interested in vertical integration for quite a while. In his
nobel-prize winning article Coase (1937) pointed to the importance of transaction
costs. Contracts need to be written and enforced, and this is rarely costless. In
railroads, for instance, similar conﬂicts may emerge as the ones analysed by Gertner
and Stillman (2001): To provide but one example, when many railroad companies
operate on the same network, who should pay the ﬁne when there are delays? It
is not by chance that economists have often looked at railroads as examples of
successful vertical integration. The most famous example is Chandler’s book on
the managerial revolution in the US (1977) in which he argues that railroads were
the ﬁrst industry in which the modern corporation emerged. While top manage-
ment took care of ﬁnancial issues and investment, professional middle management
emerged in order to coordinate complicated transport ﬂows over a steadily increas-
ing rail network. Recent empirical work from other industries shows that it is most
interesting to exploit variations over time and across sections, i.e., to use panel data
sets. Friebel et al. (2003) investigate the eﬀects of railroad reforms on eﬃciency in
a panel of European railways over more than 20 years. We ﬁnd that in general re-
forms have improved eﬃciency of European railroads, but that nothing meaningful
c a nb es a i da b o u tt h ee ﬀects of infrastructure separation.
The problem with the design of empirical work on the costs and beneﬁts of
vertical integration is that in railroads there are to date few ﬁrms per country.
Hence, few observations are available. When there is such a lack of data, it can be
useful to look at in-depth case studies that can help in highlighting the diﬀerences
in coordinating adjustment eﬀorts within and across the boundaries of the ﬁrm.
Some examples of such problems are the measurement of wear and tear of tracks
or the reduction of noise, the prevention of accidents, upgrading of trains and
infrastructure, to name but a few.Bibliography
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